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An embeddable testbed for insurgent and
terrorist agent theories: InsurgiSim
Barry G. Silverman∗, Aline Normoyle, Praveen Kannan, Richard Pater, Deepthi Chandrasekaran and
Gnana Bharathy
Electrical and Systems Engineering, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6315, USA
Abstract. Many simulators today contain traditional opponents and lack an asymmetric insurgent style adversary. InsurgiSim
prototypes an embeddable testbed containing a threat network of agents that one can easily configure and deploy for training and
analysis purposes. The insurgent network was constructed inside a socio-cognitive agent framework (FactionSim-PMFserv) that
includes: (a) a synthesis of best-of-breed models of personality, culture, values, emotions, stress, social relations, mobilization,
as well as (b) an IDE for authoring and managing reusable archetypes and their task-sets (Section 2). Agents and markups in this
library are not scripted, and act to follow their values and fulfill their needs. So it’s desirable to profile the agents (eg, faction
leaders, cell logisticians, followers, bomb maker, financier, recruiter, etc.) as faithfully to the real world as possible. Doing
this will improve the utility of InsurgiSim for studying what may be driving the insurgent agents in a given area of operation as
Section 3 explains. InsurgiSim’s bridge is an HLA federate and can be embedded to drive all or some of the insurgent agents in a
3rd party simulator. Three such examples are summarized in Section 4. The paper closes with next steps to improve InsurgiSim’s
capabilities and utility.
1. Introduction
As the nation faces 21st century adversaries and na-
tional security challenges, traditional military actions
alone such as sorties flown, rounds fired, or tons of re-
lief materials delivered, are proving less and less likely
to guarantee the desired outcome unless complemen-
tary behavioral solutions are also considered. The al-
ternative is to focus strategically on the desired out-
come, study the adversary’s likely behavior, and ex-
plore alternative ways to affect the desired result. This
concept of better understanding and influencing poten-
tial adversaries (and friends) is central to the needs of
diplomacy and national policy making. It is consistent
also with the military’s need to shift to a new paradigm
where they consider all the “effects” of various actions
as well as alternative pathways to “effect” the same
outcome. This is coming to be labeled as effects based
operations (EBO) or actions: e.g., see McCrabb and
Caroli [9], Pendall [15]. When we take actions, make
∗Corresponding author. E-mail: basil@seas.upenn.edu.
commitments or issue utterances, what are the behav-
iors of targeted and other leaders likely to be, especially
those influenced and constrained by many sub-groups
and special interests? As Smith [20] points out, EBO
needs to focus on how we can “shape the adversary’s
thinking and behavior, rather than on simply defeating
his forces.” Unfortunately, as Caroli et al. [2] point out,
most wargames include traditional threats and there are
very few tools available to help understand how lead-
ers and other adversaries behave, that capture what is
in their hearts and minds, and that can be used to un-
derstand what might influence their behavior and ef-
fect the outcomes we desire. There is a need to con-
vert wargames so they offer the proper training and/or
analysis capabilities.
1.1. Theories of insurgency/terrorism
A number of theories currently exist about the roots
of insurgent and terrorist movements, how they grow,
and how recruitment might work (and be hindered) –
e.g., see Borum [1]’s review of instinct, drive, social
learning, and cognitive theories as well as Collier [5]’s
ISSN 1872-4981/08/$17.00 © 2008 – IOS Press and the authors. All rights reserved
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review of economic greed and poverty based theories.
Many of these are ‘paper-based’ theories with survey
and event data to support them. But these theories have
not been implemented within a detailed socio-cognitive
agent-based modeling and simulation framework such
as we present here. Implementation is valuable since
it serves to test the theories, expose their strengths and
weaknesses, and uncover gaps in behavior that the the-
ories do not explain. In general, science is often ad-
vanced by a combination of reductive analysis and syn-
thetic usage. The goal of this effort is on the latter.
Specifically, we have been constructing a testbed to re-
search and possibly merge different terrorist and insur-
gency theories. We believe this testbed serves a second
purpose of providing a toolset that can be embedded to
alter and extend traditional wargames as Caroli et al.
mention. We demonstrate both of these goals in this
paper.
To begin, one can readily envision an insurgency
existing in a world where a number of factions or
clans range across the spectrum from those desiring
the rule- of-law to those interested in chaos and regime
change for any of a variety of reasons (ethno-political
grievance, greed, crime, etc.). This is depicted across
the top of Fig. 1. Indeed, in the Maoist theory of
armed struggle, the preparatory stage of an insurgen-
cy is characterized by actions that seek to affect sepa-
rate factions of the population of the nations or regions
they are trying to influence, causing different factions
to iterate (dynamically) through several states ranging
from animosity and paralyzing fear to sympathy and
membership in the insurgent movement [8].
Ideally one would like to realistically simulate such
behaviors for the purposes of being able to train against
it and analyze what influences it in a given area of op-
eration. To train/analyze how to coopt the agenda of an
insurgency and mobilize the populace toward the rule
of law one needs a set of simulated factions and insur-
gent agents readily adapted to any given region. Since
members of a given populace will be at varying degrees
of support for and participation with each side, this im-
plies that the aim of counter insurgency is not solely
to destroy groups at the enemy end of the spectrum,
but also to progressively shift individuals and groups
closer to the friendly end. In fact, since insurgent cells
are often hidden amongst supporting members of the
population (bottom of Fig. 1), a focus strictly on reac-
tion to insurgent attacks can be counter-productive. It
will leave the agenda in their hands, cause collateral
damage to potentially woo-able factions, and make the
force for order seem to have no successful agenda of its
own. Instead one must encourage the force for order
to use a ‘full spectrum’ of approaches to help diagnose
the source of grievance, attempt to ameliorate the root
causes, and build up whatever services and institutions
that are lacking and potentially also causing discon-
tent: eg., see USMC [?], Kilcullen [7], Patraeus [11],
Nagl [12], Chiarelli [4].
If we were to create a cast of digital archetypes, say
for Iraq as an example of a wide array of characters that
might appear in many scenarios, we might be talking
about archetypes of varying ages and genders cover-
ing moderate and extreme Sunnis, Shi’ites, and Kurds,
as well as extremist Infiltrating Arabs, and of course
unsuspecting civilian victims (contractors, NGO types,
press corp, etc.). One could presumably use these to
craft scenarios relevant to a range of locales, particu-
larly if some of the archetypes also included various
regional leader types, specific types of holy sites, hot
houses, and other situational triggers. But how should
we craft the archetypes of the various groups and lead-
ers? What would make them legitimate? What would
make them easily reconfigured for a new locale? How
could an analyst or a scenario or training developer
use them one day to recreate a Fallujah that probably
can be won only at intolerable costs; the next day to
construct a hunt for an Al Sadr type who is hiding in
a religious site surrounded by his angry followers; a
third day for chasing Taliban or Al Quaeda renegades
through the foothills of Afghanistan populated by in-
different or hostile warlords and tribal members; or a
fourth day to mock up the impact on the populace and
on peacekeeping of the press release of news of Abu
Grabin style prisoner mistreatments? The list goes on.
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2. Socio-cognitive agents
In this paper we pose the question of how well can
the field of modeling and simulation (M&S) recreate
insurgent operations such as just described? Specifi-
cally, we are particularly interested in the insurgency
landscape as a complex social system and hence we
want to explore the question of what can agent-based
simulation offer? That is, if we use agents to help mod-
el the ‘parts’ and their micro-decision processes, can
we observe macro-behaviors emerging that are useful
for analysts and trainees to know about? Finally, if we
want to model and simulate a social system from the
bottom up, then it seems that we need to approach it
with agent technology that covers both the social pro-
cesses that influence people as well as cognitive pro-
cesses that people use in reasoning and emoting over
their fates. That is, we are curious about what can
‘socio-cognitive’ agents offer to the study of sub-state
actors and/or stressed social systems?
Sun [21] provides a useful survey of the respective
fields of social agents and cognitive agents and shows
that there are very few environments that straddle both
topics to provide socio-cognitive architectures. In this
paper, we therefore illustrate one such architecture and
provide some insights into how it works, what it is
useful for, and whether its outputs provide any validity
for training and analysis.
2.1. Social framework: FactionSim
FactionSim is a tool where you set up a conflict sce-
nario in which the factional leader and follower agents
all run autonomously. You are the sole human player
interacting to try and use a set of DIME (Diplomat-
ic, Informational, Military, and/or Economic) actions
to influence outcomes and PMESII (Political, Military,
Economic, Social, Informational, or Infrastructure) ef-
fects. Factions are modeled where each has a leader,
two sub-faction leaders (loyal and fringe), a set of start-
ing resources (Economy,E, Security, S, and Politics, P),
and a representative set of N follower agents. A leader
is assumed to manage his faction’s E- and S- tanks so as
to appeal to his followers and to each of the other tribes
or factions he wants in his alliance. Each of the leaders
of those factions, however, will similarly manage their
own E and S assets in trying to keep their sub-factions
and memberships happy. Followers determine the level
of the P-tank by voting their membership level (a top-
ic discussed in PMFserv). A high P-tank means that
there are more members to recruit for security missions
and/or to train and deploy in economic ventures. So
leaders often find it difficult to move to alignments and
positions that are very far from the motivations of their
memberships.
FactionSim is well documented in the literature and
that won’t be repeated here: e.g., see Silverman et
al. [18,19]. It also has attained a level of maturity. For
example, it was used in 2006 to model 7 factions of Iraq
with over two dozen named leaders and many archetyp-
ical followers (top layer of Fig. 1). That implementa-
tion was successfully tested and approved for realism
by a group of SMEs that DARPA assembled for two
weeks at one of the military COMs. As of this writing
and for all of 2008, FactionSim is being used under
DARPA sponsorship to assemble profiles and models of
all the major factions of 15 countries around the Pacific
Rim. Part of that effort is looking into automating the
generation of factional models. As part of a separate
AFOSR effort we are studying how various theories of
insurgency may be implemented within FactionSim.
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2.2. Agent cognition: PMFserv
Beginning in 1999, our lab has developed a human
behavior model called Performance Moderator Func-
tion Server (PMFserv) that includes: (a) a synthesis of
about 100 best-of-breed models of personality, culture,
values, emotions, stress, social relations, group dynam-
ics, as well as (b) an IDE for authoring and managing
reusable archetypes and their task-sets.
The unifying architecture in Fig. 3 shows how dif-
ferent subsystems of PMFserv are connected. For each
agent, PMFserv operates what is sometimes known as
an observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop [14].
PMFserv runs the agent’s perception (observe) and
then orients all the entire physiology and personal-
ity/value system to determine levels of fatigues and
hunger, injuries and related stressors [6], grievances,
tension buildup, impact of rumors and speech acts,
emotions [13] and various mobilizations and social re-
lationship changes since the last tick of the simula-
tor clock. Once all these modules and their parame-
ters are oriented to the current stimuli/inputs, the upper
right module (decision-making/cognition) runs a best
response algorithm to try to determine or decide what
to do next. The algorithm it runs is determined by its
stress and emotional levels. In optimal times, it is in
vigilant mode and runs a subjective expected utility al-
gorithm that reinvokes all the other modules to assess
what impact each potential next step might have on its
internal parameters. The agent calculates the subjective
expected utility (SEU) it expects to derive from every
action available to it, as constrained by perception and
chooses the alternative that maximizes SEU. Thus
Best Response (SEU): (1)
Max{ΣU(ak) ∗ Pr(ak) ∗ Φ(rj) + ψ}
where utilities (U) for next actions, ak, are the antic-
ipated E|S|P (Economy, Security, Politics) tank gains
or losses the actions afford combined with how those
affect the agent’s value system. Φ (rj) is a function that
captures the strength of positive and negative relation-
ships one has with agent or object j that are effected or
spared by ak, and ψ handles merging and discounting
(decay) prior action’s affect on the agent’s value sys-
tem. When very bored, the agent tends to lose focus
(perception degrades) and it runs a decision algorithm
known as unconflicted adherence mode. When highly
stressed, it will reach panic mode, its perception basi-
cally shuts down and it can only do one of two things:
cower in place or drop everything and flee. In order to
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Fig. 3. PMFserv, an example cognitive architecture.
instantiate or parameterize these modules and models,
PMFserv requires that the developer profile individuals
in terms of each of the module’s parameters (physi-
ology, stress thresholds, value system, social relation-
ships, etc.). Some of these features will be discussed in
subsequent sections in explaining how the InsurgiSim
agents reason about their missions.
PMFserv is in use by an intelligence agency to mod-
el diplomatic decisions of world leaders for which it
has passed statistical correspondence tests showing it is
significantly in agreement with their decision-making:
see Silverman et al. [18]. PMFserv has also reached the
level where it can realistically simulate ethno-political
conflicts among regional leaders and their followers vy-
ing over control of contested resources and assets (pub-
lished validation studies for application in the Far East,
MidEast Africa, and domestically are in Silverman et
al. [16,17,19]. FactionSim makes use of PMFserv to
run both leader and follower agents and to use their
micro-decision making to study group dynamics and
how macro-behaviors and new equilibria autonomous-
ly emerge. This is useful for studying the impact of ac-
tions and effects (DIME-PMESII) both from analytical
as well as training and rehearsal perspectives.
3. InsurgiSim overview
InsurgiSIM is a human-trainer tunable, autonomous
insurgency force (leader, followers, missions and daily
life, etc.) that you can play against. It is intended for
plugin to a multi-player game world, first person shoot-
er, or in a wargame such as one of the US military’s
Semi-Automated Forces (SAF) environments to study
tactics, observables, and effects-based operations and
issues. Many of these worlds include adversaries but
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the AI is such that either they use a scripted finite state
machine approach useful for force-on-force symmetri-
cal encounters or else a human red team is expected to
play out the asymmetric force’s roles. This is time con-
suming and expensive. A prime objective of the Insur-
giSim project is to provide an autonomous, culturally
realistic, sentient insurgent force to drive the reasoning
of the agent avatars in such a game world.
Looking back at earlier Fig. 1 and as discussed in
Section 2, FactionSim runs PMFserv agents as the in-
surgent leaders that populate the top layer of that dia-
gram – the faction layer. In 2006, we added a second,
more tactical layer – the cell layer. To do this we built
several further archetypes of PMFserv agents that can
be configured as an insurgent cell as shown at the base
of Fig. 1. That is, we developed reusable archetypes
of a threat network of agents (e.g., logistician, di-
verse followers, and soon- to-be-added bomb maker, fi-
nancier, recruiter, etc.), world markups (e.g., safe hous-
es, VBIEDs, mosques, FOBs, etc.), and mission scenar-
ios in a graphical environment. These sentient agents
have a daily routine (live, eat, pray, meet, etc.) and
live amongst the rest of the populace. They have cul-
turally appropriate values, emotions, stressors, and the
like. We discuss them further in the next several sub-
sections. First we examine the strategies of the faction
leader who deploys them as a loose hierarchy or net-
work of adversaries to the force-for-order. It should be
noted that InsurgiSim’s strategic and cell layers were
each built separately as stand-alone elements in 2006 –
the strategic layer for DARPA and the cell layer for
embedding inside the JointSAF or JSAF environment
to assist a red cell of the Urban Resolve effort. Since
that time we have merged the two components into a
unified architecture and in 2008 we are embedding it
in a virtual village for the USMC. Rather than worry
about historical details, in the remainder of this article
we will discuss all applications as if they are the unified
one.
3.1. Strategic layer
One selects the faction that is ideologically leading
the cells and profiles and instantiates its leader. For
example, a named Jihadist leader or imam, a charis-
matic guerilla, or a separatist. The faction leader car-
ries out the overall campaign against the other factions,
and in the present architecture is the primary source
for recruiting new insurgents and other support to his
cause. As described in Section 2.1, the faction lead-
er uses its decision making to decide operations such
as non-violent protests, psyops campaigns, economic
ventures, defensive efforts, and so on. It does not close-
ly control the cells, but it does signal when it thinks
another faction should be attacked. If the cell carries
out a successful attack, the factional leader also has the
means to publicize this and generally will.
Central to a given leader’s value system reasoning is
its perception of who threatens it and/or whom it’s vul-
nerable to. Likewise a given leader may be equally in-
terested to estimate who can it influence to best increase
its resource assets and thereby its power in the world.
Obviously, individual leader value system weights will
govern how aggressively a given leader pursues each
of these vulnerability vs. power concerns, however, we
assume that all leader agents need to be able to compute
how vulnerable and/or powerful they are at each turn
of a game. Since the game rules define precisely which
resources can be used to take hostile actions against
which other resources, one can derive a measure of a
player’s vulnerability directly from the state of the game
world and the rule set. Intuitively, by factoring vulner-
ability into the world utility calculation, an agent can
avoid world configurations in which another is poised
to conduct a devastating attack. Adding border defens-
es, stocking up on supplies, and pulling money out of
the economy can all be viewed as behaviors motivated
primarily by vulnerability management.
The vulnerability formula (β) works by generating
the percentage of a given player’s tokens that can be
expected to be lost to a given player in the coming round
of attack actions (ai). For each hostile action (aiεA)
that can be initiated by another player (g), the number
of tokens available to attack and defend is tallied. From
this the probability of victory is determined, and then
multiplied by the percentage of tokens vulnerable to this
attack versus the total number owned by the vulnerable
player in each resource category. This is the expected
percentage of tokens to be lost if this attack occurs in
the next round. The maximum over all attacks, then,
gives this player ’s vulnerability score β to player y.
βxy= Max a ∈A
〈
Pr (a) ∗ σ(x,a)C(x)
〉
(2)
Agents who purely manage vulnerability, while in-
teresting in their behavior, are not entirely realistic.
Human players tend to balance vulnerability against
its inverse, power. Where vulnerability measures the
expected number of tokens a player can lose to other
players in the coming round, power measures the ex-
pected number of tokens a player can take from others.
The calculation of the power heuristic is exactly the
opposite as for vulnerability. Player A’s vulnerability
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Fig. 4. Insurgent Cell Starting Configuration Panel.
to Player B is the same as Player B’s power over Player
A.
Taking the leader’s perceived difference between
power and vulnerability provides a surrogate for the
leader’s overall sense of utility of the current state of
the world, G, when divorced from his value system and
other factors:
Ul(Gx) = αx−βx (3)
In standalone FactionSim games there is no spatial
graphics or 3 D representation. The insurgent faction’s
security forces are simply poker chips that the leader
decides to wager on a militaristic venture against an-
other faction. In those games the battle outcomes are
decided in a contest held by the game engine (using
random coin flips for each poker chip played against
another faction’s defenses). By building the cell layer
of Fig. 1, we are endowing a third party game world an
ability to conduct and display the actual operations.
3.2. Tactical decision layer
To begin, a training developer decides how many
cells to place under the factional leader and populate the
game world with. For each cell, a GUI editor (Fig. 4)
allows one to rapidly setup alternative configurations
and types of insurgency forces and mission parameters,
depending on what is desired for combat studies and
training efforts. For a given cell, the upper right of
Fig. 3 shows the types of missions one can current-
ly allow the cell to undertake (chosen based on train-
ing needs). And one can check off whether PMFserv
should play the cell logistician or if a human should
play it instead.
The PMFserv cell logistician does not coordinate
with the faction leader, but is a follower and will tend
to respond to intermittent, high level guidance such
as whether to attack another faction or not. When it
responds to such signals, the PMFserv logistician is
not scripted, but uses its perception and value system
to decide everything such as what specific missions
to undertake, when to do them, specific assets of the
opponent to target, who to assign them to, and when
to lay low. It constantly reassesses the expected utility
of each course of action relative to its value system
and by also making use of the same type of power and
vulnerability computations as mentioned earlier (but
for a narrower span of control). Because it uses its
own individualized cognition, it is possible that a given
cell logistician may be more or less aggressive than the
factional leader had hoped. Its also possible for it to be
stressed and to commit errors and react emotively.
3.3. Mission layer
The left hand side of Fig. 5 allows the training de-
veloper to alter the quantity and mix of types of foot-
soldiers to include in the cell at the start of the simu-
lation. These invoke different archetypes within PMF-
serv. At one extreme are those most loyal to the cause
and willing to undertake any mission even a suicide
bombing. At the other extreme are more convention-
al fighters, possibly even those who are coerced into
missions. These latter tend to be new recruits and are
the most likely to decide not to do a given mission
assigned by the cell logistician. For example, on the
right side of Fig. 5, the extreme Radical Agent can be
seen to value the safehouse and emplaced IEDs more
highly than the average Fighter Agent does (left side).
Likewise the Fighter agent seems to see many daily life
routines as having positive utility – going to place of
worship, recreation, etc. These are utilities at the start
of a random run.
Utility calculations come from an agent summing
its positive and negative emotional arousals relative to
how the world state is causing success and/or failure
of the values it feels are important. Figure 6 illustrates
this “cognitive appraisal” of the world with the right
hand side depicting a portion of the Asymmetric Fighter
agent’s value system and its importance weights. The
left side indicates an agent that is highly distressed, an-
gered, and disliking of the world state. Figure 5b shows
an agent right after conducting a mission (IED em-
placement and detonation), and the positive emotional
construals that precipitates.
This discussion points out that the foot soldiers of
the cell live at the safehouse which happens to be at the
upper right of Fig. 6b. They are the squares in green.
Yellow circles with stars inside are potential targets
that the logistician might communicate with a mission
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Fig. 5. How two different foot soldiers differ in their assessment of
the utility of various missions.
assignment, while rectangles (blue) are the forces for
order in this environment. The explosion symbol at the
base of Fig. 6b designates a successful IED mission
that destroyed a bridge, some adversaries, and some
civilians. The popup window shows the PMFserv view
into the head of the agent that carried out the IED
mission
The bottom of the Fig. 6b popup also lists the mis-
sions currently being carried out by all the agents of the
cell. One can see that many of the cell members are
in fact doing daily life activities. Based on their utility
calculations of the world state, agents may opt to do
missions from the cell leader or not. Further, even if an
agent accepts a mission, these other missions (daily life
routines) are still options that it may return to. When
carrying out a mission, an agent may pause it to do
something else, resume later, or abort altogether. Thus
it might pause when carrying an IED from the safe-
house to a car if the blue forces are noticed outside, and
then resume after they move on. The decision to start a
mission, pause, resume, or abort is up to the individual
agent and is based on its re-assessment of its strength
of group affinity (membership level), congruence with
the value system and action choices of the group leader,
and concern for its own safety and other values. As
membership and congruence grow or fall, the agent will
alter its loyalty and willingness to undertake assigned
missions. Or it may abort a given mission altogether
due to lack of commitment to the group and concern
for its own safety, and instead choose to go eat some
food, meet a friend, etc.
 
(a)
(b)
Fig. 6. (a) Shred of a bayesian-weighted value hierarchy and the
emotions it precipitates. (b) How conducting a mission alters an
agent’s emotional state.
4. Inter-operation with external simulators
InsurgiSim is intended to drive the behavior of agents
in 3rd party simulators. PMFserv has previously been
embedded behind a number of applications, game-
worlds, and simulators – e.g., Unreal, Sony OpenSteer,
Big World, a diplomacy game engine (Athena’s Prism),
OneSAF, and JSAF. Such implementations generally
work with a Bridge or Gateway program that links
PMFserv (or InsurgiSim) and the 3rd party simulator.
Here we illustrate the latter of these interoperation ef-
forts by explaining the PMFserv side, the bridge, and
finally the JSAF side.
4.1. PMFserv sim side services layer
PMFServ has been designed to be easily leveraged
by external simulators to provide human PMFs. Be-
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cause the domain and resolution of simulations using
PMFserv services can vary greatly PMFserv was de-
signed to be domain agnostic. PMFserv uses a simple
interchange mechanism to allow its models to interact
and be driven by external simulations. This interchange
mechanism is simple enough that it can be developed
on a per simulation basis.
The reader may recall that each PMFserv simulation
contains agents and a series of objects that the agents
can perceive and make decisions about. This collection
of objects represents the “World” that the agents inhab-
it. The objects contain rules that drive how an agent
perceives them in terms of his value system. PMF-
serv’s integrated development environment (IDE) pro-
vides the tools needed for composing these objects. A
running version of PMFserv remains until an external
simulation makes a change to a PMFserv object. Once
an object has had its state changed PMFServer reacts
to the change by updating all of the agents who can
observe the change. This results in an Agent’s physi-
ology, perceptions, stress, emotions and decisions be-
ing updated. These new updated agents are immedi-
ately available to affect external agents as PMFServ’s
“Performance Moderators”.
The state information that is shared between PMF-
serv and an external simulation is determined during
the knowledge engineering phase of development. For
example if you are modeling a car in PMFserv you
might include information about its current speed and
direction. You might event want to include something
as esoteric as what the car’s bumper sticker says. This
depends on what is determined to be relevant to the
perceptual types and affordances that capture the be-
haviors and culture that pertains to the simulation’s do-
main. Once you have modeled an object in PMFServ,
an external simulation can access this object at runtime.
This means a racing simulation could share state infor-
mation between one of its ‘cars’ and the one modeled
in PMFServ.
4.2. Interchange layer and bridge services
External simulators and InsurgiSim will generally
be asynchronous and operate on differing time-scales.
A key service of the bridge is to facilitate this asyn-
chrony so that each side is only notified when changes
occur that are significant to that side (publish and sub-
scribe pattern). Via a simple exchange of property and
value information InsurgiSim models can thus provide
PMFs to a wide range of simulation architectures with-
out major changes to its code base. Another service of
Fig. 7. The Bridge approach to embed InsurgiSim.
the bridge layer is to support translation lookup tables.
These are authored at setup time. They contain trans-
lations between InsurgiSim’s parameters (e.g., name,
value, units, aggregation, etc.) and those of the third
party simulator.
To support such services, we have defined an inter-
face layer between InsurgiSim and any 3rd party sim-
ulators, using a global blackboard and a simple syn-
chronization loop. Each agent has methods which both
check desirable InsurgiSim parameters and execute mo-
tions and graphics on the selected platform and appli-
cation. Thus we need to define the parameter sets and
the protocols to set, query, and update state of mutual
interest to both InsurgiSim and the human display mod-
els. It needs to be bi-directional since low-level activi-
ties (navigation, perceptions, threats, injuries, etc.) can
clearly affect PMFs.
The Bridge communicates with JSAF using HLA
and with InsurgiSim using XML-RPC (see Fig. 6). In-
surgiSim exposes the properties of its objects via an
API. This API allows a simulation to both set state
and retrieve state from any PMFserv agent or object.
Because of the loop’s simplicity, InsurgiSim can be
used with a multitude of disparate simulators. Using
this bridge approach, PMFserv has been synchronized
with external simulations via Microsoft’s COM (Un-
real Tournament), the HLA/RTI protocol, and TCP/IP
(LeaderSim project). Another application of PMFserv
similar to InsurgiSim is called CrowdSim and it has
used this same bridge architecture to interface PMFserv
agents to drive behaviors of crowd members in Python’s
C-API (opensteer crowd model), DARPA’s Real World,
JSAF, and OneSAF. The interchange choice is highly
dependent on the external simulation and its own in-
ternal simulation loop. The nature/number of state in-
formation exchanges that are necessary to support the
accompanying PMFServ Model and the native enviro-
ment of the external simulation also play a large roll in
the development of the a synchronization loop.
A generic synchronization loop is:
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1. External simulation calls InsurgiSim and informs
it of a state change. Alternatively InsurgiSim
could poll an external Simulation for pertinent
state information.
2. InsurgiSim processes this new information and
updates its agents.
3. The external simulation requests any PMF Mod-
erator variables that it uses.
4. The external simulation uses the new information
to moderate itself.
5. New external simulation state forces the loop to
repeat.
This bridge is portable and can be placed to reduce
latency. As Fig. 7 shows, InsurgiSim currently runs on
any MS Windows platform. It is written in a portable
Python, but certain of its security admin functions are
currently tied to MS operating systems. JSAF, in turn,
is optimized to run under Linux. Since JSAF updates
its state in real-time and InsurgiSim is needed less fre-
quently (but runs faster than real time when invoked),
the messaging flow was optimized by placing the bridge
on the Linux platform with JSAF.
4.3. JSAF layer services
To coordinate JSAF with InsurgiSim (and its two
software servers for this project RedLarry and Leader),
the Bridge needs to synchronize JSAF entities with In-
surgiSim agents, forward user configuration (safe hous-
es, ICs, targets, etc.) from JSAF to InsurgiSim, and
finally translate each agent’s high-level decisions into
concrete JSAF entity tasks. Therefore, to communicate
with JSAF, the Bridge is also an HLA federate. As
Fig. 8 reveals, it subscribes to InsurgiSim control inter-
actions and publishes JSAF task interactions. Specif-
ically, when a human operator inputs information in-
to the PMFServ Orders menu (it is called PMFserv in
the JSAF menu structure), JSAF sends a corresponding
interaction to the Bridge. Through these interactions,
users can constrain and alter missions along with their
parameters (e.g. objects, vehicles, or weapons) and as
earlier Fig. 1 portrays. The Bridge also detects and
forwards dynamic environment information that may
affect an InsurgiSim agent’s decision (such as the num-
ber of enemy or blue units in the immediate vicinity of
a JSAF agent/entity).
As the Leader and Red Larry (which hosts the foot
soldiers) agents make decisions, the Bridge controls
their corresponding JSAF entities via task interactions,
such as “move to building X” and “mount vehicle Y”.
That is, our Leader Server runs FactionSim and the Lo-
gistician Agent who picks out the missions for the Red
Larry foot soldiers. They in turn decide how to carry out
these missions, the phases or task steps needed, when
daily life routines are warranted, when to abort, and so
on. They also monitor how well their corresponding
JSAF entities are doing in executing these tasks. Final-
ly, when an InsurgiSim agent has made a choice, the
Bridge translates it to JSAF’s virtual world. Therefore,
to synchronize the decisions from InsurgiSim with the
tasks in JSAF, the Bridge must continuously monitor
the tasking status of both InsurgiSim agents and JSAF
entities. Users can learn what orders InsurgiSim has
issued by looking at the messages passed between the
Leader, the Red Larry agents, and the Bridge.
5. Conclusions and next steps
This article has described a reusable insurgent force
simulator that allows one to test different theories of
insurgency and plug them into a 3rd party simulator to
drive the insurgent avatars and to play against them for
training or analysis purposes. The theories contained
in the default version of InsurgiSim straddle individu-
al psycho-physiological ones (stress, emotion, sacred
values, etc.) as well as social ones (belonging, mobi-
lization and grievance, group membership, motivation-
al congruence). One can edit these starting theories
with the internal editors of FactionSim and PMFserv.
As such, InsurgiSim serves as a successful proof-of-
existence test for socio-cognitive agent architecture.
The first version of InsurgiSim’s cell layer was com-
pleted and fielded at the end of 2006 as part of the Ur-
ban Resolve testbed: see Ceranowicz and Torpey [3].
Its role there was to support the red team so they did
not have to operate every foot soldier and decide ev-
ery mission. The first version of InsurgiSim’s strategic
layer was also fielded in 2006 as part of an initiative
to assemble a country model of Iraq. Other country
models are now under construction.
In addition, we have plugged InsurgiSim into two
other applications. The screen shots of Bagdad shown
in this article are not JSAF, but are those of a test harness
we built in MS Windows. The only entities in this
world are the InsurgiSim agents, and they are embodied
only within a 2-D or plan level viewer. This does allow
us to view their decision making and movement around
the terrain.
All layers of InsurgiSim are being unified and put to
use as part of a virtual village we are currently assem-
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Fig. 8. Message flows for the JSAF federation.
bling for the US Marine Corp. Called NonKin Village,
this is a gameworld that brings life to agents of all fac-
tions of FactionSim in sort of a SimCity style of play
although it supports street level interaction and dialog
with agents to learn their issues, needs, grievances, and
alignments and to try to assist them in countering the
agenda of the InsurgiSim faction. If you mis-manage
the situation, various factions and members might be
drawn to the insurgent faction’s side.
5.1. Next steps
To support InsurgiSim,we successfully implemented
first versions of several features that are now open for
further research. In fact, there are a host of further
research directions that a project like InsurgiSim opens
up. We mention but a few of these here.
(1) Terrain reasoning – PMFServ and InsurgiSim
currently reason about the terrain from a
mission-level perspective (e.g., consider rele-
vant locations, select targets, and think up what
supplies to bring where). This nicely comple-
ments JSAF entities’ ability to navigate to points
in the environment, move around, avoid colli-
sions, aim and fire weapons, etc. FactionSim
leaders, on the other hand reason strategically
about each faction’s relative strength, assets, and
point of vulnerability. In the present JSAF ver-
sion, strategic reasoning is wasted since the ter-
rain data is devoid of up-to-date information on
which factions control what assets and what con-
dition they are in. The same applies to the pop-
ulace identities and factional memberships, and
to the economic status of each faction. Projects
like the Army’s Human Terrain program hold
the potential to alter how country databases are
marked up with things like property ownership,
socio-economic status and value of various as-
sets, and factional leanings of the populace. We
think FactionSim offers guidance on what those
markups should provide and offers a rich base
for exploring how agent based reasoning about
terrain would use it.
(2) Campaign reasoning – the InsurgiSim agents at
all levels (strategic, tactical, and mission) do not
come up with new plans. Instead, they are able to
use emotions and value systems to reason about
and select between alternative plans, missions,
and life routines and for which group to do them.
Also, PMFserv has built in functions for agents
to form a model of other (MOO) agents. This
is based on a technique of mirroring one’s val-
ue system through an alignment matrix to deter-
mine the other’s values. Mirroring is a human
bias and often leads to projecting inappropri-
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ate assumptions about the motivations of others.
Hence it is of interest to see where this type of
MOO and other more rational MOO approach-
es lead the agents. These and other forms of
campaign reasoning are worth exploring further.
(3) Theory of insurgency/terrorism – As stated at the
outset, the default version of InsurgiSim comes
with built in theories of insurgency and terrorism
based on social-psychological models of sacred
values and ethno-political factional grievance as
well as more materialistic greed concerns such
as control of resources. A big part of the reason
for constructing InsurgiSim the way we did atop
a socio-cognitive agent framework is so that one
has a theory testbed with which to conduct stud-
ies of how people’s behavior shifts as different
theories are attempted and as varying policies for
mitigation are pursued. One alternative theory
we have begun investigating is the dual sector
model of a developing economy. Many other
such theories merit study as well.
(4) Cultural bridge – At present the bridge provides
translation services limited by the few charac-
ter animations that are often found inside of the
3-D gameworlds. PMFserv pumps out param-
eters about emotive, physiologic, and motiva-
tional state that few 3-D viewers in the military
domain are able to animate. To make matters
worse, the ideal translation table should suggest
changes in gestural and communicative acts that
are relevant for the culture being gamed. That
is, if PMFserv outputs a warm greeting request,
this translation could invoke the proper gestures
and terms to utter for the relevant culture. This
is feasible, but it needs someone to research and
assemble all the parts.
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